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Abstract
We argue that recent developments in proof-of-work consensus mechanisms
can be used in accordance with advancements in formal verification techniques
to build a distributed payment protocol that addresses important economic draw-
backs from cost efficiency, scalability and adaptablity common to current decen-
tralized record-keeping systems. We enable the protocol to autonomously adjust
system throughput according to a feasibly computable statistic - system difficulty.
We then provide a formal economic analysis of a decentralized market place for
record-keeping that is consistent with our protocol design and show that, when
block rewards are zero, the system admits stable, self-regulating levels of trans-
action fees and wait-times across varying levels of demand. We also provide an
analysis of the various technological requirements needed to instantiate such a
system in a commercially viable setting, and identify relevant research directions.
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1 Introduction
Blockchain technology (Nakamoto (2008)) offers a decentralized alternative to tradi-
tional record-keeping systems. Rather than relying on known central parties, trans-
actions are verified publicly by a decentralized network of record-keepers (“miners”)
that perform computationally expensive tasks (“proofs”). As anyone can choose to
become a record-keeper in the system, blockchain technology offers a potential so-
lution to well-known limitations of competition among centralized ledgers (Abadi
and Brunnermeier (2018)). From an economic perspective, competition is essential to
disciplining rent-extraction by record-keepers.
However, existing blockchain technologies suffer from important economic limita-
tions. The underlying proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanism that ensures cor-
rectness/trust poses inefficient levels of cost that grow linearly with the size of the
system (Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018); Budish (2018); Thum (2018)). In terms of scal-
ability, binding technological capacity constraints limit the ability of current systems
to process new record entries at levels that would make them suitable for widespread
use. Further, unlike standard decentralized economic markets, blockchains have the
property that the level of supply (i.e. number of transactions verified per block) is
not determined by profit maximizing miners, but, instead, is constant and set at the
beginning of the protocol. In terms of adaptability, such systems lack the ability to
adjust throughput (i.e. the supply) to the current level of demand (Basu et al. (2019);
Huberman et al. (2019)). This inability to adapt the supply side of the system limits the
capacity of prices (transaction fees) to efficiently regulate the market for record-keeping
and leads to high levels of congestion, transaction fees and system costs as demand
increases.
In this paper, we study the properties of record-keepers instantiated using succinct
proof systems and show positive results in terms of both scalability and adaptability.
In this model, the miners are responsible for producing proofs that a set of records (or
transactions) provided to them by end-users is valid, and to add these to an append-
only ledger while maintaining consensus. Such an approach generalizes the Bitcoin
model, in that end-users can request a record of any truth claim, which could be the cor-
rect execution of a smart contract or indeed the verification of arbitrary computation.
This is a framework in which the proof of block validity and the consensus algorithm
can be combined into one process (Kattis and Bonneau (2020)). This connection pro-
vides a link between miners’ computational work in generating a proof (and thus a
block) and overall system capacity, or the number of transactions that can be verified
in a given block (also referred to as predicate size). This is done while maintaining the
same model and security properties as Nakamoto (Nakamoto (2008)) consensus.
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This setup has the key economic implication that profit incentives to increase compu-
tational cost can be linked to overall system throughput (i.e. generating a proof of
a block verifying more transactions takes substantially longer). Since the computa-
tional work miners perform will be substantial at commercial throughput levels, any
practical instantiation of such a system would also require the distribution of proof
computation among many machines - similar to the ‘mining pool’ model in Bitcoin. We
outline the necessary engineering steps for embedding such a system into a protocol
that distributes proof computation and in which proof generation also acts as PoW.
The core economic implication of a system with both features - consensus and proof
distribution - is that adjustments in predicate size and thus block capacity serve as a
way of incentivizing miners to incur higher computational cost in exchange for higher
transaction fee revenue.
Our work provides the following contributions:
1. An integrated, empirically relevant equilibrium framework permitting an analy-
sis of the determinants of transaction fees and (entry) behavior of mining pools in
a decentralized market for record-keeping under dynamic adjustments of system
throughput according to arbitrary update rules.
2. A formal analysis of the dynamic equilibrium behavior induced by various up-
date rules. Specifically, we derive an update rule that induces constant equilib-
rium transaction fees under arbitrary levels of demand (i.e. equilibrium elasticity
of fees with respect to demand is zero due to offsetting throughput increases).
3. An outline of the necessary and sufficient design conditions for such systems to
be practically instantiatable.
We model the behavior of miners and users in order to reason about the change in
equilibrium transaction fees subject to demand shocks. We characterize the equilibrium
behavior of both miners and system users and use our model to formally derive the
optimal adjustment of throughput to changes in difficulty under which changes in
demand lead to efficient changes in system cost. We prove that under the derived
optimal rule, and when block rewards are zero, changes in demand lead to balanced
growth of throughput and mining revenues, while transaction fees and wait times
remain stable.
Our analysis yields two conditions under which stable user fees and wait times across
changing levels of demand can be sustained. First, block rewards need to equal
zero. Only if block rewards are equal to zero, changes in the equilibrium entry and
computational behavior of miners and thus difficulty can serve as a sufficient statistic
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for changes in demand. Although important at the early stages of network growth,
positive block rewards act as a subsidy in this context and decrease market efficiency.
Second, predicate size updates need to be gradual enough so that sudden large changes
in demand do not destabilize the system. Up to some maximal tolerated change
in demand, an update rule which takes into account changes in difficulty to alter
predicate size proportionately to the shift in demand would admit stability in its
average transaction fees and wait times. Note that this admits a trade-off between the
magnitude of the change in demand that can be tolerated and the time it takes for the
system to converge to equilibrium.
We then analyze the conceptual and quantitative implications of our theoretical anal-
ysis for the practical instantiation of a scalable, self-regulating record-keeping system.
We first look at related work on distributed proof generation (Wu et al. (2018)) and
compare the functional equivalence of our model’s assumptions to the observed data.
This provides design specifications and proof system properties that can be used to
construct payment systems with stability guarantees. We then detail the various areas
of engineering relevance required in explicitly instantiating such a protocol. We outline
the types of properties that the underlying system should possess, look at the relevant
technical literature, and provide directions for future work that will need to be done
along with sufficient conditions for its implementation.
Jointly, our results provide theoretically grounded guidance toward the practical con-
struction of a self-regulating, cost-efficient and decentralized payment system with
permissive entry structure and high security guarantees. Our design outlines how
current technical advances in the computer science literature can address significant
economic limitations of current implementations. We show how economic analysis
can help understand how technical features of the design can be leveraged so as to
align the incentives of active record-keepers with the requirements for cost-efficiency.
Further, our economic analysis provides concrete, measurable performance targets,
which we believe will be useful in guiding future efforts to build distributed payment
systems that scale in an efficient, decentralized manner to the demands of end-users.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Proof of Work
Many blockchain protocols ensure security by requiring miners to publicly verify
energy consumption (known as proof-of-work or PoW) in order to gain the right to
write transactions on the blockchain. PoW is required in order to prevent denial-of-
4
service attacks on the system: the potential for malicious entities to flood the system
with cheaply produced ‘valid’ blocks can rapidly overwhelm honest participants and
hamper the network’s ability to process valid transactions. PoW was first introduced as
a solution to the related problem of e-mail spam filtering (Dwork and Naor (1992)), and
provides the security guarantees against such attacks in Bitcoin (Back et al. (2002)). By
imposing a high energy cost for block creation, PoW makes it prohibitively expensive to
produce many valid blocks and overwhelm the system, as doing so carries a non-trivial
economic burden.
In the subsequent sections, we model this security constraint as the requirement that as
demand λ increases, some sufficient statistic (which in the case of Bitcoin is difficulty
d) also causes a proportional increase in miner costs.
2.2 Difficulty
Since the network is decentralized, the addition of a new block to the blockchain
takes some time to propagate among all parties. This is due to the latency inherent in
distributed networks, and imposes a trade-off between the size of the block propagated
and the time taken for the rest of the network to receive the updated block. This
limitation implies that the frequency with which the system accepts new blocks (‘block
frequency’) needs to be sufficiently low so that each new block has enough time to
reach the whole system. This is necessary to prevent forks (a ‘split’ in the chain), and
in practice results in a trade-off between block size and frequency. Note that this also
implies an upper bound on improving throughput through modifications to block size
and/or frequency.
Since the total number of miners is an endogenous variable that varies over time, the
protocol needs a way to ensure that a PoW solution is provided at a fixed frequency
(on average) over all participants in the network. This is achieved by requiring the
PoW puzzle to satisfy a ‘difficulty’ requirement, which would mean that the expected
time taken to generate a solution can be calibrated according to a difficulty parameter
that can be changed over time. Through the use of time-stamps, the Bitcoin PoW
algorithm keeps track of the average block frequency in the last 2016 blocks and alters
difficulty up or down accordingly. By performing this adjustment proportionately to
the deviation of the block frequency from a hard-coded value (10 minutes/block in
Bitcoin), the system ‘self-corrects’ the difficulty of the PoW puzzle to ensure constant
block frequency. This mechanism is crucial to ensuring that blocks in Bitcoin are found
every 10 minutes, so that the previous blocks had enough time to propagate in the
network and the threat of forks is minimized. In the subsequent analysis, we model
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the block frequency as a random variable µ (the block arrival rate) with a constant
expectation (the ‘block time’) mirroring the above technological constraints.
2.3 Difficulty Adjustment
The underlying system consists of a set of users and miners, who each are responsible
for requesting and providing proofs from and to the system respectively. Everyone
has access to the underlying state of the system, which consists of a sequence of valid
transactions that have been processed into the system (the blockchain) along with their
respective proofs of correctness: proofs that each block added to the chain is valid.
Users submit transactions (or ‘records’) to miners along with an associated transaction
fee. The miners in turn are responsible for adding these transactions to some block
which is then appended to the blockchain. This happens if the miner succeeds in
generating a PoW solution that also acts as the proof of validity of all transactions
in the block. We denote by S the total number of transactions verified in the given
block. In order for a miner to win the right to add the next block (and hence collect the
corresponding transaction fees and block reward), they need to win the PoW game,
which is a puzzle yielding a valid block in time proportional to the underlying difficulty
parameter. This difficulty parameter functions equivalently to that in Bitcoin: through
periodic updates, the difficulty parameter is adaptively changed to ensure constant
block frequency. In this model, only miners are required to keep the whole blockchain
(or some kind of ‘state’ data structure) in order to efficiently generate new blocks and
proofs. End-users should be able to efficiently check provided proofs in order to find
the correct chain with minimal bandwidth requirements.
3 Economic Model
3.1 Overview
We model a decentralized market for throughput where transactions are verified in
batches/blocks that arrive at a random, exogenous rate µ in each unit of time. The chart
displayed in Figure 1 represents the key forces in our model.
Miners compete for the right to verify an incoming set of transactions in exchange
for transaction fees and block rewards. They choose the profit-maximizing number of
workers among which to distribute proofs to simultaneously verify block correctness
and generate a PoW solution. In equilibrium all miners include the transactions offering
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Figure 1 A Model of the Decentralized Market for Throughput
Block rewards: P · br Demand: λ
Transaction fee market
t f (S, λ)
Miners: Profit maximization
pi(S, λ,N,P · br)
Free entry: Number of miners N
Difficulty: d
Predicate size S
Computational cost:
Increasing in S
Block capacity S
Fee rewards
S·t f (S, λ)
Equilibrium Supply
System property
Update: ∆S = f (∆d)
the highest fees, up to block capacity S.1 The probability that a miner gains the right to
write the next block is proportional to the number of computations that she performs.
The profitability of miners thus depends on the total number N of active miners. Free
entry requires that all miners make zero profits in expectation, which pins down the
equilibrium number of miners N.
Predicate size S corresponds to the number of transactions that can be verified in each
new block. Users arrive at the pool of pending transactions at rate λ and offer fees for
transaction verification. The determination of transaction fees results from a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves auction, where users optimally weigh the cost of higher fees against
a reduction in their expected wait time. In equilibrium, average transaction fees t f
depend on both block capacity (and thus predicate size S), and on the level of demand
λ.
Unlike standard economic markets, the level of supply - system throughput/block
capacity S - cannot be directly chosen by miners, but is instead set by the protocol. The
inability of miners to choose both their computational cost and throughput poses an
economic market failure that leads to inefficient adjustments of system cost to changes
in demand. To address this limitation, we model a system that implements periodic
updates to predicate size in accordance with an ex-ante specified update rule. The
purpose of this updating rule is to grow throughput capacity in response to changes
in demand. Our framework highlights that equilibrium system difficulty – the total
proof computations performed by all miners – responds to changes in demand, and,
1In practice, miners may choose to include different transactions in each block. As we assume that
miners observe the same pending transactions at any given point in time and miners have incentives to
include transactions with higher fees, miners all aim to verify the same block of transactions.
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therefore, serves as a natural candidate statistic to design such an updating rule.
Our framework allows us to analyze how key outcomes – transaction fees, compu-
tational cost of the system, entry of miners – respond dynamically to changes in
demand. A change in demand λ induces changes in transaction fees offered by users,
which changes difficulty by affecting the equilibrium number and size of active mining
pools. The subsequent update in predicate size changes block capacity and therefore
transaction fees, inducing in turn a change in mining profitability, the equilibrium
number of miners, and, thus, difficulty. A steady state is reached when difficulty and
thus predicate size stabilize after the initial change in demand.
In this section, we focus on characterizing the problem of economic agents, and on
defining a decentralized equilibrium. In the next section, we apply the framework
to investigate the dynamic behavior of the system under various updating rules for
predicate size.
3.2 Miners
3.2.1 The relation between hash rate, predicate size, and pool size
Miners compete for the chance to mine the next arriving block and collect the associated
mining rewards. To do so, miners distribute proof computation corresponding to
predicate size S to pools and provide PoW in terms of proofs per second H to the
system. The relationship between proofs per second H for a miner employing n
workers to solve proofs corresponding to a predicate size S is given by:
log H(n; S) = log U + σ log n − log S (3.1)
where U is a technological constant. The parameter σ governs the returns to pool
size n - the rate at which the hash rate increases as miners increase the size of their
pools. This can be thought of as a parallelization coefficient, for which throughout the
analysis satisfies σ < 1.2 Note that a value of σ = 1 would imply perfect conservation of
work in a parallel system of n workers, and as such no higher value of σ is empirically
achievable.
As evident in equation (3.1), an increase in predicate size S reduces a pool’s hash rate
for any given pool size. An increase in S thus poses a cost to the system as pools have
to distribute proofs across more workers to maintain the same hash rate.
2State-of-the-art distributive systems of SNARK proofs achieve σ ≈ 0.9 (Wu et al. (2018)).
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3.2.2 The Problem of Miners
Miners incur a cost cm · n per time unit to distribute proofs across n workers.3 Further,
(in each period) miners pay a fixed cost fm to open and maintain a mining pool. Miners
compete for the chance to mine the next arriving block. In equilibrium, all miners
include transactions offering the highest rewards up to block capacity S. Benefits of
mining a block arise from total transaction fee revenue Rev and block rewards br.
Transaction fees are denominated in USD, as users propose the transaction fees. We
specify Rev further below after having solved the problem of users. As block rewards
are exogenously set by the system, their value to miners is impacted by the exchange
rate of the currency to USD, which we denote by P. Total rewards from mining are
given by Rev + P · br.
As in PoW, the probability that a given pool is selected to mine the next block depends
on its hashrate relative to the aggregate hashrate of the system.4 We denote individual
pools by i and the aggregate hashrate of the system byH = ∑i∈{Active Pools}Hi.
Taking predicate size S and the aggregate hashrateH as given, a miner i chooses pool
size ni so as to maximize expected profits pi given by:
pi (ni; S,H) = H (ni,S)H (Rev + P · br) − cm · ni − fm, (3.2)
where H (n,S) is defined in equation (3.1).
A Nash equilibrium requires that equilibrium pool sizes are pinned down by miners’
best-responses:
n∗i = arg maxn pi
(n; S,H) (3.3)
The solution to this problem is given by:5
n∗i =
(
σ (Rev + P · br)
cm(S/U)H
)1/(1−σ)
. (3.4)
3In practice, miners distribute and assemble proofs while workers solve small computational prob-
lems. The cost cm summarizes both margins.
4Chen et al. (2019) and Leshno and Strack (2019) show that proportional selection is the only allocation
rule that satisfies a set of desirable properties, e.g. anonymity, collusion-resistance, and sybil-resistance.
5When setting ∂pi∂ni = 0, we assume that miners are small in the sense that they don’t internalize
the effect their computations have on aggregate hash-rate H . Our qualitative results do not crucially
depend on this assumption.
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3.2.3 Entry and the Equilibrium Number of Miners
Everybody is free to enter the system as a miner. In equilibrium, the number of miners
N adjusts to ensure that upon entry, mining pools make zero profits in expectation.
Since mining pools are symmetric, in equilibrium n∗i ≡ n∗ and H = NH (n∗). Using
equation (3.4), the optimal pool size can be shown to equal:
n∗ =
σ
cm
· Rev + P · br
N
(3.5)
The equilibrium probability that any miner is chosen to mine the next block equals
Hi
H =
H
NH = 1/N. Substituting equation (3.5) into profits given by equation (3.2) and
imposing zero expected profits upon entry, the equilibrium number of miners is given
by:
N =
(1 − σ)
fe
· (Rev + P · br) (3.6)
The equilibrium number of miners is increasing in mining revenues and decreasing in
the entry cost. By virtue of our implementation, miners that solve predicates of size S
and get chosen to write the next block can verify up to S transactions. Since there is entry
cost and miners cannot force other miners into a coalition, miners have no incentive
to form coalitions with the intent to temper with transaction fees in order to increase
profits.6 Therefore, miners include transactions that offer the highest transaction fees
up to the capacity limit.
3.3 Demand for Transactions and Determination of Fees
We can now describe the problem of users, which yields the equilibrium level of
transaction fees. The demand side of the model closely follows Huberman et al. (2019).
Our model is distinct in one key dimension. The adaptive nature of our protocol
implementation implies that block capacity S and thus equilibrium system throughput
is not a primitive, but rather an equilibrium outcome.
Users have single transactions and are heterogeneous in the cost that verification delay
poses for them. New users enter the pool of pending transactions at a constant random
rate per time unit and offer transaction fees for service. Knowing that a higher posted
fee improves the chances of being included in a block sooner, users willingness to pay
arises out of the opportunity cost of delay.
6For example, a large coalition may choose to not include transaction fees below a certain threshold.
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3.3.1 Users
Users arrive at Poisson rate λ at each point in time. λ parametrizes demand intensity
or the rate at which the pool of pending transactions grows over time. An arriving user
is identified by a wait cost c, which is drawn from a continuous cumulative density
function F(c) with domain C ≡ [0, c¯] ⊆ R+0 and probability density function f (c). The
expected benefit of using the system to a user endowed with wait cost c and offering
transaction fee t f is given by:
U
(
t f ; W, c
)
= ν − t f − cW (t f ; G) ,
where ν > 0 governs the value of a verified transaction to a user7 and W
(
t f ,G
)
is
the expected wait time for a user that posts fee t f . The Wait-time W depends on the
(endogenous) distribution of transaction fees posted by all users G(t f ) in the system
and is thus itself an equilibrium object.8
3.3.2 The Dependence of Fees on Wait Time
Each active user posts a fee t f so as to maximize utility, weighing the cost of posting
higher fees against the benefit of lowering the expected wait time. Standard arguments
imply that equilibrium transaction fees are a continuous, monotonous function of user
wait-cost t f (c) satisfying t f (0) = 0 and t f ′(c) > 0. Monotonicity implies that G
(
t f (c)
)
=
F (c) . Equilibrium transaction fees t f (c) solve the first order condition W′
(
t f |G) = −1c
which is equivalent to the following differential equation:
W˜′ (c|F) c f (c) = t f ′(c),
where W˜ directly maps wait cost into wait times and satisfies −W′(t f |G) = W′(c|F).9
Integrating and using the property that users with no delay cost post zero fees, trans-
action fees can be fully expressed in terms of equilibrium wait times:
t f (c) =
∫ c
0
c˜ f (c˜)W˜′ (c˜|F) dc˜. (3.7)
7In practice, users have an outside option and only participate if their utility from doing so exceeds
this outside option. Throughout the analysis, we assume that ν is sufficiently high so that users are
willing to participate.
8The assumption is that users know the distribution of wait times F and are assumed to correctly
anticipate the optimal behavior of others. However, users do not observe the current pool of pending
transactions when submitting fee offers.
9Note that G
(
t f (c)
)
= F(c) implies G′(b(c))b′(c) = f (c). Thus W′(t f |G) = W′(t f |G) f (c)/b′(c).
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Inspecting equation (3.7) reveals that equilibrium fees have the externality correcting
property inherent to the Vickrey-Groves-Clark (VCG) auction mechanism.10 For our
purposes, the fact that offered transaction fees are socially optimal has the implication
that none of the potential cost-efficiencies exhibited by the decentralized equilibrium
arise from suboptimal user behavior.
3.3.3 EquilibriumWait Time
Blocks can process up to S transactions per time period and arrive randomly at Poisson
rate µ. The equilibrium wait time naturally depends on system congestion, which in
our context is defined as ρ ≡ λ/Sµ - the average ratio of demand λ to the average
number of transactions that can be processed per time unit. ρ < 1 implies that while
users may experience delays, all transactions will eventually be processed by the
system.
To characterize the equilibrium wait time, we build on results derived in Huberman
et al. (2019). The authors show that for sufficiently high levels of block capacity, wait
times are fully characterized by system congestion ρ.11 We restate this result in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Huberman et al. (2019)) 1. For any ρ ≡ λ/(µS) ∈ (0, 1) the equilibrium
wait time for a user with delay cost c, W(c; S, µ, λ) is given by:
W(c;ρ) =
µ−1
1 − (1 + α (ρF¯(c))) e−α(ρF(c)) , (3.8)
where F(c) ≡ 1− F(c) and α(x) is the real root of the algebraic equation e−α + xα− 1 = 0.
2. Equilibrium wait time is increasing and convex in congestion ρ and decreasing in user
wait cost c.
Proof. See Lemma 14 in Huberman et al. (2019). 
The relationship between equilibrium wait times and optimal bidding behavior implies
that users with higher wait cost offer higher fees, and wait less for transaction verifica-
10An externality arises as each user delays the verification of the transactions of other users. Despite
the fact that users do not internalize the cost that they pose on others, the VCG auction mechanism
incentivices "truthful bidding", implying that the users with higher valuations submit higher bids.
11Huberman et al. (2019) show wait times are appropriately approximated for S = 20. Block capacity
in Bitcoin is equal to 2000. As outlined earlier, we expect our proposed protocol implementation to be
capable of handling a volume of transactions per block that outperforms Bitcoin by magnitudes. We
therefore feel comfortable to use the characterization of wait times in equation (3.8) for the remainder
of the analysis.
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tion. Higher levels of system congestion increase wait times - and therefore transaction
fees - for all users. Theorem 1 implies that wait times - and, therefore, transaction fees
- are fully characterized by system congestion ρ,12 implying that equilibrium stability
in fees is equivalent to stability in system congestion ρ.
3.3.4 Equilibrium Transaction Fees
To summarize the optimal bidding behavior across all users, Theorem 1 and equation
(3.7) allow to derive the average equilibrium fee revenue Rev per unit of time, given
block capacity S and system congestion ρ:
Rev
(
S, ρ
)
= S ·
∫ c¯
0
t f (c)dF(c) = S · ρ
∫ c¯
0
(
F¯(c) − c f (c)) W (c;ρ) dc ≡ S · ψ (ρ) . (3.9)
ψ(ρ) in equation (3.9) is the average level of transaction fees per unit of time that users
are willing to pay for service.13 As Rev summarizes the optimal bidding behavior
of users, demand side effects stemming from changes in either block capacity S or
demand λ are fully captured by its properties.
The key focus of our analysis is to characterize the system’s ability to induce incen-
tive compatible increases in throughput so as to absorb an increase in demand λ at
constant average prices. The responsiveness of average fees ψ
(
ρ
)
with respect to
changes in demand λ - or generally changes in congestion ρ - is key for this purpose.
To this end, we define the elasticity of ψ(ρ) in equation (3.9) with respect to ρ as
ε
(
ρ
) ≡ ∂ logψ(ρ)∂ logρ ≡ ρψ(ρ) ∂ψ(ρ)∂ρ . ε (ρ) captures the percentage increase in equilibrium fees in
response to a percentage increase in congestion ρ. The following theorem characterizes
key properties of ε
(
ρ
)
and in particular shows that it admits a uniform upper bound,
independently of the underlying distribution of wait cost F(c). The proof is delegated
to Appendix A.
Theorem 2 The elasticity of equilibrium average transaction fees ψ
(
ρ
)
with respect to system
12In principle, wait-times depend on block capacity S in addition to congestion. On the one hand
for a given transaction, the inclusion in a block depends on how many pending transactions have
accumulated at the time block is generated. This depends on system congestion ρ. On the other hand,
the inclusion of the transaction might also depend on new transactions with higher priority that might
arrive before the next block. The arrival of higher priority users creates significant randomness and thus
affects wait times only if blocks have sufficiently small capacities such that new arriving transactions
can significantly change the composition of included transactions. For sufficiently high S, however, wait
times are nearly independent from this source of variation.
13As we characterize steady states in a fee market where there is a constant flow of transactions in
and out of a system that eventually verifies all transactions and where all users participate, the integral
is taken over the entire domain of c.
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Figure 2 Upper Bound on the Congestion Elasticity of Equilib-
rium Average Fees
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Notes: This figure plots the uniform bound on the elasticity of equilibrium average fess given in
equation (3.9) with respect to system congestion ρ = λ/µS as a function of ρ on the x-axis.
congestion ρ, ε
(
ρ
) ≡ ∂ logψ(ρ)∂ logρ , is bounded below by 1, increasing and convex in ρ. Further,
there exists ε
(
ρ
)
such that ε
(
ρ
) ≤ ε (ρ) for all ρ ∈ (0, 1) and any distribution of user wait cost
F(c).
Figure 2 plots the uniform upper bound on the elasticity of average fees with respect
to changes in congestion derived in Theorem 2.
Total mining fees Rev summarize the demand-side in the market. Jointly with the free
entry condition for miners, Rev allows us to derive the equilibrium number of miners
N for a given predicate size S.
3.4 Equilibrium for a Fixed Predicate Size S
3.4.1 Equilibrium Number of Miners
A partial equilibrium for a given predicate size S and demand level λ is defined by the
condition that miners make zero profits in expectation upon entry.14 Using equation
(3.6) and the characterization of total mining fee revenues, the equilibrium number of
14While this equilibrium is technically a steady state - owing to the continuous entrance and exit of
users - we effectively treat it as a static equilibrium condition.
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miners N at predicate size S, demand λ and nominal block rewards PBr is given by:
N (S, λ,Pbr) =
1 − σ
fe
· (Sψ (ρ) + Pbr) . (3.10)
Predicate size S, demandλ and nominal block rewards PBr summarize the profit incen-
tives of miners. Adjustments in predicate size S, therefore, change the profit incentives
and entry behavior of miners. Cost-efficiency in a decentralized equilibrium crucially
depends on whether adjustments of predicate size S can be optimally calibrated so
as to induce incentive-compatible equilibrium behavior of miners that is as if miners
internalized the externality that they pose on others through Nakamoto consensus. To
build intuition for our later results, it is useful to briefly pause to discuss how adjust-
ments in predicate size S shape profit incentives of miners through the condition in
equation (3.10).
An increase in demand λ initially increases mining fee rewards through an increase
in equilibrium user fees ψ(ρ). This increases entry, the equilibrium number of miners,
and the computational cost of the system without adding benefits for system capacity
or users. To restore cost-efficiency, a subsequent increase in predicate size S has to
direct additional cost incurred by the system toward increases in throughput. Our
results imply that competition by miners ensures that this is achieved by additional
entry and lower hash-rates for each active pool.
3.4.2 Difficulty
As opposed to for example Bitcoin, difficulty in our model depends only on the total
number of proofs computed per time unit.15 As pools are symmetric, solely distribute
one proof computation among pool participants and operate at hashrate H, system
difficulty is given by:
d = log
(
µ ×H ×N) . (3.11)
Using the equilibrium expression for the number of miners and the solution to the
miner’s problem, difficulty can be expressed as:16
15This is because the solution of a single proof commits to the nonce before distributing computation
to the pool. This means that, unlike the distribution of double-SHA computations in Bitcoin (that
effectively break up nonce generation among pool participants), here the nonce is set by the operator,
and all computation forwarded to workers is nonce-specific.
16Note that the solution to the miners’ problem implies that equilibrium hashrates are given by
U
(
σ fm
(1−σ)cm
)σ
/S.
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d = log
(
α × Sψ(ρ) + P · br
S
)
, (3.12)
where α ≡ µU
(
σ
cm
)σ ( 1−σ
fe
)1−σ
is a constant.
The inability of miners to autonomously adjust cost and throughput upwards as de-
mand rises causes rising levels of system congestion, resulting in high wait times and
fees for users, and costly increases in mining activity at no increase in throughput as
demand rises. In light of this significant economic limitation, a core innovation of
our protocol design is to provide an "updating rule" for predicate size S and therefore
block capacity that correctly infers changes in demand. While demand λ is not directly
observable, equation (3.12) highlights that difficulty is a sufficient statistic for changes
in demand when block rewards are zero. When block rewards are zero, changes in
equilibrium difficulty are proportional to changes in average transaction fees, which,
in turn, depend solely on congestion ρ.
3.5 Dynamic Throughput Adjustment
We endow the system with the ability to periodically adapt throughput S according to
a pre-specified updating rule.
Definition 1 (Law of Motion for Throughput) Let X be a vector of statistics. A law of
motion for throughput S is a function f such that:
St+1 = f (St,St−1, ...;Xt,Xt−1, ...) (3.13)
Given an updating rule, we can define a dynamic equilibrium, and the notion of a
steady state.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium) Given a starting predicate size S0, level of demand λ and nominal
block rewards Pbr, an equilibrium is a sequence of predicate sizes {St}t=1,2,... such that at each t,
(i) transaction fees posted by users satisfy equation (3.9), (ii) the equilibrium number of miners
Nt satisfies free entry in equation (3.6) and (iii) the law of motion for S is given by equation
(3.13). A steady state is reached when changes in predicate size S converge to 0.
So far, we have provided a framework to analyze how the optimal behavior of miners
and users determines fees and the energy usage of the system. In the following, we
utilize this framework to analyze whether chosen laws of motion for throughput can
replicate equilibrium outcomes of standard competitive markets where firms are able
16
to autonomously adjust production in accordance with demand.17
4 Stablizing Congestion
Unlike standard markets, the level of supply cannot be directly chosen by miners, but
is set by the protocol through the predicate size S. Absent changes in S, increases
in demand raise congestion in the system causing exorbitant cost at little benefit to
users. In this section we show that suitable updates of throughput help overcome
this limitation. Specifically, as equilibrium difficulty encodes changes in demand, we
show that updates of predicate size S in accordance with changes in difficulty allow
to adjust throughput to changes in demand. This section outlines why stable levels of
congestion are desirable, and shows by way of simple examples how our framework
allows us to analyze the viability of various update rules.
4.1 Characterizing Efficient Outcomes
Here, we briefly outline why stable levels of congestion are desirable from a welfare
perspective. In equilibrium, the net benefit that the system produces can be character-
ized in terms of value that transactions generate across all consumers, wait times as
well as the cost of energy used by pools:
νλ −Average Wait-time (λ,S) − Total Energy Cost (S) .
Free entry implies that the total energy cost of the system must equal mining rewards.
Abstracting from block rewards, total mining revenues increase at least proportionally
to system congestion, as do average wait times. To ensure that the net benefits of the
system do not decrease as demand λ increases, changes in demand λ should be offset
by proportional changes in S. It is easy to see that this would imply that the benefit of
the system would remain invariant to how many people use it.
In conclusion, an ideal adjustment of predicate size S to changes in difficulty keeps
wait times and congestion ρ = λ/(µS) constant, allowing for proportional growth in
demand and supply.
17 Definition 2 defines an equilibrium taking both block rewards Pbr and demand λ as given. The
underlying assumption is therefore that adjustments in predicate size S occur sufficiently frequently -
or equivalently that the length of periods dt is sufficiently small - for the system to reach steady states
between changes in demand or block rewards.
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4.2 Floating Difficulty Level
Consider a policy rule that upon observing a change in difficulty between perdiods
t − 1 and t, updates predicate size S in t + 1 as follows:
log (St+1/St) = γ (dt − dt−1) . (4.1)
We focus on analyzing transitions between equilibrium steady states in response to
changes in demand when block rewards are zero. We analyze constraints on the up-
dating parameter γ stemming from two objectives. First, γ should ensure convergence
of the system to a new steady state. Second, economic efficiency requires that changes
in demand yield minimal changes in congestion.
Assume the system is in steady state with predicate size S0 and congestion ρ∗ = λ0/µS0.
We consider a change in demand d logλ ≡ log(λ1)− log(λ0) from λ0 to λ1. The object of
interest is the elasticity of steady state system congestion with respect to this demand
shock, d logρ
∗
d logλ . The following proposition summarizes the properties of this object.
Proposition 1 Consider an initial steady state {S0, λ0} and assume that block rewards are equal
to zero. Under a floating difficulty regime, upon a change in demand d logλ ≡ logλ1 − λ0,
1. the system converges to a new steady state if γ < 1
ε(ρ) , where ε
(
ρ
)
denotes the upper
bound on ε
(
ρ
)
derived in theorem 2 and ρ ≡ max {λ0/µS0, λ1/µS0}.
2. if γ ∈
(
0, 1
ε(ρ)
)
, then steady state changes in system congestion are strictly less than
proportional to changes in demand: d logρ
∗
d logλ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
Proof. Using the recursive structure of the system, write the elasticity of steady state
congestion with respect to a demand shock as:
d logρ∗
d logλ
= 1 +
∞∑
t=1
(−γ)t  t∏
k=0
ε
(
ρt
)
Using theorem 2, the proposition follows from standard properties of geometric sums.

The first part of Proposition 1 shows that dynamic stability imposes a feasibility re-
striction on the rate at which predicate size (and thus throughput) can be increased in
response to some demand shock. For γ > 1/ε
(
ρ
)
, changes in predicate size would be
large enough at every step to ensure that the system diverges from equilibrium. Thus,
18
the value of γ needs to be low enough so that this is prevented. Note that this imposes
a new trade-off in efficiency: a lower γ ensures that higher demand shock levels can be
‘absorbed’ without instability, but also means that the system will take longer to arrive
at equilibrium (as predicate updates are less sensitive to changes in difficulty).
The second part of the above result demonstrates that such a record keeping system
with γ > 0 does strictly better than one where S is fixed. This is due to the upper
bound on the elasticity of steady state system congestion, which shows that congestion
will increase at a fraction of the non-adaptive case. Although they will increase com-
paratively less, it is immediate that transaction fees remain unbounded: an arbitrary
sequence of positive demand shocks will always increase difficulty arbitrarily high,
pushing up equilibrium fees as well. Further, to ensure dynamic stability at possibly
high levels of congestion requires sufficiently low γ, which impedes the speed of con-
vergence. In fact, the only choice for γ that ensures dynamic stability under a floating
difficulty regime as λ→∞ is γ = 0.
In the traditional Bitcoin protocol, an unbounded difficulty parameter is required due
to the security benefits that it provides. This is by making the cost of disrupting the
network scale with d. Note, however, that an increase in difficulty here is not necessarily
required for system security: the costs of participation are increasing with respect to
both difficulty and predicate size. This means that ‘difficulty’ in the sense of Bitcoin is
actually better understood to be Sd here, as both of these parameters are monotonically
increasing with respect to costs per unit time. This motivates the question of whether
constant equilibrium transaction fees can be achieved without compromising system
security.
4.3 Pegged Difficulty Level
Consider a policy rule that updates predicate size S as follows:
log
St+1
St
= γ (dt − d∗) , (4.2)
where d∗ is a pre-specified level of difficulty.
Again, consider a demand shock d logλ. The following proposition draws out con-
ditions on the update parameter γ under which the system maintains a stable steady
state level of congestion ρ under zero block rewards.
Proposition 2 Assume that block rewards are equal to zero, and difficulty is pegged to d∗.
Denote ρ¯∗ ≡ ψ−1 (exp(d∗/α)) with α given in equation(3.12). Under a pegged difficulty
regime, upon a change in demand d logλ ≡ logλ1 − λ0 yielding a change from ρ∗ to ρ,
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d logρ∗
d logλ = 0 for any γ ∈
(
0, 2
ε(ρ)
)
, where ρ ≡ max{ρ∗, ρ}.
Proof. Under a pegged difficulty regime, the equilibrium elasticity of congestion with
respect to a demand shock can be written as:
d logρ∗
d logλ
= ε
(
ρ0
) ∞∏
1=1
(
1 − γε (ρt)) .
The result follows from theorem 2 and the above expression. 
Rule 4.2 allows for the a priori selection of some acceptable congestion level ρ∗ by fixing
(or ‘hardcoding’) the corresponding d∗ in the update rule. In this case, the system will
increase predicate size S accordingly until system difficulty drops back to d∗. Therefore,
the long-term equilibrium effect on congestion is zero. Such a system has the desirable
property that transaction fees at equilibrium will always revert to constant: the effects
of any demand shock will be fully compensated by changes in predicate size, which
will revert transaction fees to their previous equilibrium level.
Technically, the crucial change that permits such desirable behavior lies in the ‘decou-
pling’ between the sufficient statistics for system security and demand in the above
update rule. Indeed, the costs of participation rise monotonically with S, while costs
of transactions are only functions of d. Thus, by ensuring that the system will always
update S as a reaction to changes in demand so as to fully compensate for any changes
in d, we are able to keep equilibrium transaction fees constant regardless of the demand
shock as long as γ is low enough.
4.4 Positive Block Rewards
We conclude our analysis by briefly discussing how positive block rewards, br > 0,
affect our key results. In the presence of positive nominal block rewards, miners’ profit
incentives are not fully determined by mining fees and therefore entry and changes in
difficulty only are an imperfect measure of demand. Consequently, changes in demand
cannot be fully absorbed through proportional scaling of throughput. Further, changes
in nominal block rewards - either due to an increase in P or a (scheduled) decrease
in block rewards br - will cause changes in throughput that are (potentially) detached
from fundamental user demand. While nominal block rewards serve as a subsidy to
sustain mining incentives at low levels of initial demand, they therefore pose a cost in
terms of economic efficiency.
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5 Towards an Instantiation
The feasibility of the construction in the preceding sections depends heavily on the
properties of the underlying proof system utilized, as well as on the fulfillment of tech-
nical requirements for the underlying PoW scheme. In this section, we (1) outline the
engineering ingredients essential to the efficient realization of such a system, (2) illus-
trate that the economic assumptions made are consistent with empirical observations,
and (3) identify potential design challenges.
5.1 Proof System Choice
Research into the design and implementation of proof systems relevant for use in the
above context has seen rapid advancements in recent years. Current implementations
of Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) (see Groth (2016),
Ben-Sasson et al. (2013), Parno et al. (2013) for definitions) provide extremely fast proof
verification times and small proof sizes, seeing active use in blockchain protocols (see
Sasson et al. (2014) for an example). Of such systems, the main relevant properties are:
1. Succinctness: Proof size needs to be small enough to add to the blockchain
2. Trustlessness: The proof system imposes no trust assumptions
3. Variability: Easy to produce/verify many different predicates
4. Recursion: Current proofs can efficiently verify previous proofs
Such restrictions have been the focus of active research in proof system design. Proof
systems with the property of succinctness, or proof sizes that don’t vary with respect to
predicate size, generate proofs that can be efficiently computed and are small enough (<
1 kB) in state-of-the-art implementations such as Groth (2016). However, the majority
of such systems are either reliant on cryptographic assumptions that are known to
be falsifiable in the quantum setting, or come with changes in the trust model such
as the need for an initial setup by a trusted third-party, thus violating notions of
trustlessness. Moreover, such implementations do not provide the flexibility needed
by the above model to adaptively change the number of transactions being verified in
each block - doing so here comes with the corresponding prohibitive cost of rerunning
the trusted setup procedure each time we update the size of S. This is because in these
constructions the creation/validation of proofs for a given predicate require the initial
generation of a predicate-specific Single Reference String (SRS) that is required in all
subsequent computation.
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Recent work has looked into resolving the above challenges while maintaining effi-
ciency. SNARK constructions that are based on a universal SRS have been developed
(Maller et al. (2019), Groth et al. (2018)) in which the SRS generation procedure needs
to be done only once for all potential predicates. This means that one SRS suffices to
generate proofs for any number of transactions (i.e. any predicate size). Other designs
with different trade-offs have also been developed (for more information, see Chiesa
et al. (2019b), Bowe et al. (2019), Ben-Sasson et al. (2018), Chiesa et al. (2019a), Gabizon
et al. (2019)).
Indeed, the ‘ideal’ proof system should be (1) trustless (rely on no trusted setup pro-
cedure), (2) plausibly quantum-resistant, (3) support proofs for multiple predicates
through a universal SRS, and (4) support recursive proof composition - or the ability to
verify previous proofs efficiently. The first three technological requirements together
would be required for an effective instantiation of the above protocol, while (4) would
cut the bandwidth costs needed by new end users to enter the system to negligible.
5.2 Integrating Proof of Work
The core of the proposed protocol relies on a PoW procedure that generates a proof
of correctness for a set number of transactions that are verified (the ’predicate size’)
in each block. For the proof generation procedure to act as a suitable PoW function,
certain restrictive properties need to be fulfilled. This is achieved for a simple payments
protocol in Kattis and Bonneau (2020), built on top of a recursive proof system. Since
the ability to use proof generation as a suitable PoW puzzle is essential for the present
proposal, techniques to generate PoW-suitable predicates and/or proof systems is an
immediate area of interest for future work. Moreover, assessing whether the approach
in Kattis and Bonneau (2020) can be easily extended to proof systems based on different
underlying assumptions (such as proof systems that support universal SRS generation)
is a natural next question, as is assessing whether this approach can also be used in
more complex predicates that support a wider array of features (such as arbitrary code
execution/smart contracts).
5.3 Distributing Proof Computation
Since the proof generation techniques that can be potentially used in the current context
require substantial computational resources, in the absence of hardware-acceleration
techniques this is only feasible if proof generation can be adequately distributed among
workers. This approach is similar to the ‘mining pool’ model in current PoW-based
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cryptocurrencies, wherein a mining pool operator (the "miner") distributes part of the
PoW computation to workers who, in turn, are guaranteed a percentage of returns in
exchange for working for the specific pool. Such an arrangement can provide workers
with the ability to receive less income albeit more frequently, and thus has the benefit
of distributing large PoW computational burdens among many small participants.
In the context of proof generation, the work of Wu et al. (2018) provides the first
framework for SNARK proof distribution among many nodes. Since the guarantees of
the proposed protocol depend heavily on the proof generation cost function, empirical
performance of SNARK generation in a distributed setting is crucial to assessing the
accuracy of the present model. Indeed, the fundamental assumption on the functional
form of the production function in this model is directly observed in the empirical
results of Wu et al. (2018), indicating that this model is representative of distributed
proof production dynamics, at least in the context of Groth (2016). Moreover, these
results suggest a potential σ value of σ ≈ 0.88.
Furthermore, distributed proving techniques for proof systems with desirable proper-
ties need to also be developed. More specifically, techniques such as those employed
in Wu et al. (2018) should be applied to other proof systems that support additional
features, such as trustlessness or universal SRS generation. Finally, in order to fully
emulate the threat model inherent to current mining pools, an effective solution needs
to be devised to ensure that mining pool participants cannot submit invalid compu-
tation to the pool operators. In the present model this would require the workers to
also provide a proof-of-correctness for their individual computation to the operator
that is both cheap to verify (comparatively to performing the computation itself) and
efficient to perform. Although this is not necessarily required in the context of trusted
pools, it would be an important feature for any pool open to a public set of (potentially
adversarial) workers.
5.4 Data Availability Considerations
An important issue that is relevant in the present discussion is that of data availability.
Since miners are providing proofs of correctness, in order for participants to update
their state accordingly the transactions that resulted in the updated blocks need to also
be released. If these are added to the propagated blocks, this becomes a bottleneck in
the potential throughput of such a system since block sizes cannot exceed certain sizes
(∼ 1 MB). A promising line of work in resolving this problem uses Coded Merkle Trees
Yu et al. (2019), which can be used to reconstruct the relevant transaction data even in
the context of a single honest node. Investigation of whether such an approach can be
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incorporated here is also a relevant avenue for future work.
6 Conclusion
Drawing on recent developments in the literature aimed at optimizing the scaling of
distributed payment systems, we have provided a protocol specification that addresses
economic cost efficiencies from correctness verification, PoW security guarantees and
throughput adaptability. We have shown how to link throughput to an observable sys-
tem statistic that adequately reflects changes in user demand and have demonstrated
by way of an economic analysis how to autonomously regulate incentives of system
participants so as to ensure cost-efficient scaling to user demand. We believe that
an implementation of this approach is feasible given the current state of knowledge,
provided that engineering efforts yield the necessary tools that our theoretical analysis
highlights.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let ψ
(
ρ
)
= ρ
∫ c¯
0
(
F¯(c) − c f (c)) W (c, ρ) dc. First, the derivative of the wait time is
equal to:
∂W
(
ρ
)
∂ρ
= e−α(ρ)α(ρ)3W(ρ)3.
Therefore, the elasticity is given by:
ρ
W
(
ρ
) ∂W (ρ)
∂ρ
= ρe−α(ρ)α(ρ)3W(ρ)2. (A.1)
Evidently, this elasticity is increasing in ρ. Thus, the elasticity of average transaction
fees is given by:
d logψ
(
ρ
)
d logρ
= 1 + ρ
∫ c¯
0
ωcF¯(c)e−α(ρF¯(c))α(ρF¯(c))3W(ρF¯(c))2dc,
where ωc ≡ F¯(c)−c f (c)W(c,ρ)∫ c¯
0 (F¯(c)−c f (c))W(c,ρ)dc
. Given that α(ρ)→ ∞ as ρ→ 0, a uniform bound on this
elasticity is given by:
d logψ
(
ρ
)
d logρ
≤ 1 + ρe−α(ρ)α(ρ)3W(ρ)2 ≡ ε (ρ) .

28
